This article from Disaster Recovery Journal is worthwhile reading for those interested in the issues of emergency management and what kind of leadership is required. The article documents the lessons learned by the NPLI:
National Preparedness Leadership Initiative (NPLI), a joint program of the Harvard School of Public Health and Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, the meta-leadership framework and practice method has been developed by observing leaders in high-stakes, high-pressure situations including large-scale natural and man-made disasters. One recent example: NPLI faculty and staff observed the slowly unfolding Deepwater Horizon disaster at the behest of Rear Admiral (RDML) Peter Neffenger of the US Coast Guard, Deputy National Incident Commander to Admiral (ADM) Thad Allen, commandant of the US Coast Guard, and presidential-appointed national incident commander.
While I have an instinctive phobia about almost any term using "meta," there is much worthy of consideration here. Here is one nugget, as an example: Incident leadership is distinct from, yet complementary to, incident management.
Understanding that difference is what this article is all about. The authors correctly point out that a major event like DWH is not one event, but many. It was:
1) an environmental impact event;
2) a large global corporate event;
3) a small business event;
4) a legal event;
5) a political event;
6) an engineering event;
7) a media event;
8) a public relations event;
9) a federal event;
10) a state event;
11) a local or “parish” event;
12) a policy event.
I think this is a very important insight. One reason that Adm. Allen was so effective in his role as the National Incident Commander is he understood most if not all of these various events, and worked to deliver a common approach and common message across all of them. I think that many emergency management leaders, particularly those trained and experienced as Incident Commanders, may tend to see an event from the operational and planning perspective while forgetting the multiple dimensions of a major event. As the authors point out: In the end, people will determine the success or failure of any crisis response.
In that regard, the authors were least complimentary of the leadership and management of the "media event" that was DWH:
Finally, and perhaps least well executed, was leading across to the media which shaped the situational awareness of many stakeholders including political figures and the public. The oil flow issue is illustrative. When the media became aware of underwater video of the disgorging oil, demands quickly emerged that it be made public and that the exact rate of flow be calculated. BP, owner of the video, initially resisted. Government responders were not concerned as their response plan and actions were based on the estimated worst case flow, not actual flow. Initial official estimates proved to be far too low though actual flow was still less than the worst case scenario governing the response. Leaders’ actions reflected poor situational awareness of the non-technical aspects of situation: they were perceived as hiding information and gave credence to charges of incompetence. Their credibility was significantly damaged.
In fairness to Adm Allen, it should be pointed out that the real problems of credibility relating to underestimating the volume was prior to his being appointed to that position. But also, in all fairness to the BP leadership, they repeatedly said that the volume didn't matter because from a response standpoint they were treating it as if was unlimited--in other words, throwing everything possible at it. That message was conveyed to the media but did not get conveyed by the media. It seemed much more in the media's interest to communicate the estimates that were the best information they had at the time and then hold them accountable for their mistake when the estimates turned out to be way too low.
It is very interesting however, that the primary point of the article is about situation awareness and the example provided about a failure of situation awareness has to do with the response leadership's poor situation awareness of the non-technical (ie. communications and political) aspects of the response. Lesson learned for response management should be crystal clear here.
