Another tidbit from Tom Symonds and his taking notes at the last UASI Conference. With more fast inter-city rail being projected, and more mass transit rail systems being added every year we can just expect more train crashes. High speeds means more damages, and more injuries. Don't get me wrong, I'm not against rail travel. My father was a railroad engineer for the Illinois Central RR. To show you how old I am, he actually shoveled coal by hand when he started on the railroad as a fireman.
There are some good "lessons observed" in the notes below.
Metrolink Train 111 Collision Derailment; Scott Mottram, Assistant LA City Fire Chief.
Outstanding presentation about the afternoon rush hour train collision between a commuter train (similar to our Sound Transit) and a freight train on 12 September 2009 in which 25 people were killed and 135 injured. Chief Mottram was the Incident Commander for the event. 42 Fire Companies, 30 LAFD Ambulances, 8 Air Ambulances, and 110 Private Ambulances were some of the assets used in the response. The following are just a few of the areas he covered:
First Responders: First Responder discipline was key in the opening stages of the event. Upon arriving on the scene, responders immediately recognized the large scope of the event and positioned their vehicles in such a manner to allow for the uncongested movement of larger vehicles when they arrived. Many responders (especially the private ambulances) self-dispatched based on the media reports, including the TV helicopters. IC recognized responders were experiencing blood saturation on their PPE, gloves, uniforms, etc.
Incident Unified Command/Unified Command: IC recognized this event as a "patient generator." Interior commuter train seats and tables are fixed so the only projectiles were the passengers. Established CP at a nearby school. Established triage areas and air ambulance landing zone next to the scene. IC relied heavily on liaisons in his command staff to: find out who is on the site, what do they bring to the scene, what's their on-site phone number, and who is the decision-maker. IC did not go to RECOVERY until RESCUE was completed. Since the event occurred at 1630hrs, IC had to prepare for extensive night operations. IC briefed that "telephoto lenses" are everywhere so your every move will be photographed; some will come back to haunt you (e.g., sworn responders stood at attention and saluted as the body of a LA police officer - one of the passengers - was recovered and removed from the scene. This prompted some people to ask "why are you stopping when there are still people to be rescued?").
Extrication: "Metal memory" made it impossible to use US&R spreading tools on the commuter train: saws were effective. Cadaver dogs were ineffective due to the amount of blood and other fluids.
Volunteers: Convergent volunteers were a blessing and a problem. Off-duty nurses were of great assistance with triaging the survivors. Other civilian volunteers assisted with other duties, such as crowd control. However, IC reported there came a time when volunteers became a nuisance (lingering around the scene with nothing to do) rather than a help.
CISM: All responders need to attend. IC believes in the value of the entire stress management process.
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There are some good "lessons observed" in the notes below.
Metrolink Train 111 Collision Derailment; Scott Mottram, Assistant LA City Fire Chief.
Outstanding presentation about the afternoon rush hour train collision between a commuter train (similar to our Sound Transit) and a freight train on 12 September 2009 in which 25 people were killed and 135 injured. Chief Mottram was the Incident Commander for the event. 42 Fire Companies, 30 LAFD Ambulances, 8 Air Ambulances, and 110 Private Ambulances were some of the assets used in the response. The following are just a few of the areas he covered:
First Responders: First Responder discipline was key in the opening stages of the event. Upon arriving on the scene, responders immediately recognized the large scope of the event and positioned their vehicles in such a manner to allow for the uncongested movement of larger vehicles when they arrived. Many responders (especially the private ambulances) self-dispatched based on the media reports, including the TV helicopters. IC recognized responders were experiencing blood saturation on their PPE, gloves, uniforms, etc.
Incident Unified Command/Unified Command: IC recognized this event as a "patient generator." Interior commuter train seats and tables are fixed so the only projectiles were the passengers. Established CP at a nearby school. Established triage areas and air ambulance landing zone next to the scene. IC relied heavily on liaisons in his command staff to: find out who is on the site, what do they bring to the scene, what's their on-site phone number, and who is the decision-maker. IC did not go to RECOVERY until RESCUE was completed. Since the event occurred at 1630hrs, IC had to prepare for extensive night operations. IC briefed that "telephoto lenses" are everywhere so your every move will be photographed; some will come back to haunt you (e.g., sworn responders stood at attention and saluted as the body of a LA police officer - one of the passengers - was recovered and removed from the scene. This prompted some people to ask "why are you stopping when there are still people to be rescued?").
Extrication: "Metal memory" made it impossible to use US&R spreading tools on the commuter train: saws were effective. Cadaver dogs were ineffective due to the amount of blood and other fluids.
Volunteers: Convergent volunteers were a blessing and a problem. Off-duty nurses were of great assistance with triaging the survivors. Other civilian volunteers assisted with other duties, such as crowd control. However, IC reported there came a time when volunteers became a nuisance (lingering around the scene with nothing to do) rather than a help.
CISM: All responders need to attend. IC believes in the value of the entire stress management process.
