Over the last 12 to 18 months, the activities of a relatively small group of renegade Somalis in small fishing boats in the Gulf of Aden terrorized the shipping world and those whose livelihoods depend on the freedom of the world's oceans.
Last summer at the ESRI User Conference, a presentation of GIS time series analysis of the Somali piracy activities illustrated that the pirates' actions followed the adjustments of ships to evade the pirates. As the ships' captains changed course to avoid the pirates, the pirates reacted by changing their locations. Over time, the random incidents of piracy became more strategic, while continuing to be tactically opportunistic.
Based on unclassified documents, here's the basic story and how geospatial and related intelligence contributed to the actual reduction in incidents.
First, A brief historical perspective of piracy in Somalia. Before 1991, piracy was controlled by functional Coast Guard and Navy operations. From 1991to 1995, the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNISOM) maintained maritime security. Also be aware that during the initial periods of piracy in the early 1990s, the Somali Civil War was going on in the already politically unstable country.
In the period from 1995-2000, Somali fishermen began having armed clashes with foreign fishing vessels. Getting bolder from 2000 to 2004, Somali militias boarded and seized international fishing vessels. From 2005 to 2007, Somali's Eastern clan seized 31 vessels as far as 200 nautical miles (nm) from the east coast. As a result, the international shipping lanes were moved from 50nm to 200nm off coast. In August of 2008, there was a sharp spike in piracy in Gulf of Aden, largely from the Somali's northern clan. That's when most of us began hearing the stories in the news.
As a protective measure, the international Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) patrolled more than 2.5 million square miles of international waters to conduct both integrated and coordinated operations with a common purpose: to increase the security and prosperity of the region and establish the maritime environment as a safe place for mariners with legitimate business. According to the documents , Somali piracy is about money with no ties to terrorism (cautiously adding) -- yet.
By using a mission-based approach (which has no geographic boundaries), the task force considered adapting models from previous operations in other parts of the world, such as the Strait of Malacca (Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia). But the political instability of Somalia and Yemen presented difficulties in securing or expanding military or political cooperation.
Mapping previous incidents and understanding how the pirates reacted to changes in shipping lanes was combined with cultural and meteoritical data to produce a map of optimal times for piracy to occur and make the task force activities more effective. Cultural indicators were, of course, religious holidays and observances, when all activity might be reduced, but the key was the meteorological information and predictive services for wave height, tidal currents, time of day, and so on. Visibility, wave heights, wind, and tidal movements made operating in small vessels extremely dangerous for the pirates. Though attempts might be made at anytime, the successful piracies decreased significantly when visibility was less than 2nm, waves were 3 to 7 feet (attempts greatly reduced with wave heights greater than 7 feet), winds were 10 to 15 knots (kts). Attempts were greatly reduced with wind gusts over 20kts. When the wave heights reached 3 to 7 feet, success of piracy was reduced.
Detailed maps (like the one above) of expected wave heights, visibility, currents, and ships' positions helped international naval task force reduce piracy in the Gulf of Aden.
The analysis of geospatial, cultural, political, and meteorological data provided Naval officers with a temporary solution to the Somali pirates. In 2007, 11 ships were pirated in the Gulf of Aden and off the east coast of Somalia. In 2008, piracy peaked with 120 confirmed attacks and 43 ships seized. Following the intervention of the combined task forces, the numbers were reduced to 32 confirmed attacks and 4 pirated ships. Since February 2008, there were 98 unsuccessful piracy attempts,largely due to attention paid to the threat by combined international naval operations.
Piracy in the Gulf of Aden, with signifcantly increasing ransoms, will continue (even though news coverage has declined) to be an international problem requiring an international solution. The ultimate solution, of course, lies not on the ocean but ashore in Somalia in establishing conditions that preclude criminal activity at sea and ashore and returning stability, security, economic prosperity, governance, and the rule of law to a country that could pose another terrorist threat if only the outward symptoms of the problem are treated.
